

How indiscriminate violence fuels conflicts between groups: Evidence from Kenya

Supplementary Information

Author names removed for peer review

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1 ACLED events showing selective and indiscriminate violence being used by both military actors

A review of news sources in the main text and events from the ACLED dataset show that both Islamists and the Kenyan state have fought one another, but also targeted bystanders in lethal attacks in the years preceding our analysis. We therefore address realistic scenarios in our survey questions. The sections below illustrate prominent cases.

Islamist selective violence

Many of the armed attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab target the Kenyan state. For instance, Islamist militants struck security forces and killed four officers on 2 January 2018 along the Nairobi-Mandera road in the northeast (see ACLED event number 1365640). In an IED attack on the Mandera county governor’s convoy in Liboi (Garissa county), Al Shabab militants killed eight security officers (ACLED No. 1407698). On 13 July 2017, Public Works Principal Secretary Mariam El Maawy was killed by Al-Shabaab militants who attacked her vehicle along the highway near Lamu on Kenya’s coast (ACLED No. 1398627).

Islamist indiscriminate violence

Additionally, Al-Shabaab has targeted civilian motorists – not official convoys or security forces patrols – indiscriminately in the northeast, including in Mandara, Garissa, and Lamu counties (ACLED Nos. 1377096, 1378938, 1379139). During the time period of our study, Al Shabab also attacked Qarsa Primary School in Wajir, killing three teachers and wounding many (ACLED No. 1356101).

KSF selective violence

A proportion of these attacks targets Islamist sympathizers and combatants: In early November 2017, security forces intercepted Al-Shabaab militants near Lamu. When several escaped into the forest, they launched operation “Linda Boni” in armed pursuit, warning local residents to stay inside (ACLED No. 1376416). A similar targeted strike by KDF in Mararani on 23 October, 2017 killed four Islamist fighters and led to weapons seizures (ACLED No. 1378509).

KSF indiscriminate violence

Additionally, KSF forces have engaged in heavy-handed crackdowns that harm bystanders. In October, 2017, during widespread unrest in Kisumu county over the election outcome, police used live bullets and clubs to disperse crowds, killing several, including a toddler (ACLED Nos. 1378053, 1380903, 1381294, among others).

2 Detailed description of survey data collection

The survey is focused on exclusively urban population of Nairobi and Mombasa County, featuring local Christian and Muslim majorities respectively. Respondents within these metropolitan areas were selected using a stratified random sample. The stratification used administrative districts from which enumeration areas (EAs) were randomly selected. The sampling was based on probability proportionate to population size (PPPS). To this end, both counties were stratified into a number of districts. The number of legal adults in each district determined how many Enumeration Areas (EA) were allocated to each district. Districts with higher adult population had higher number of EA in the sample and those with lower population counts had proportionately fewer EA.

Sixteen interviews were clustered in each EA. Four interviewers conducted the interviews per EA, whereby each interviewer conducted four interviews per EA from a randomly selected sampling start point. To identify this start point, the survey team used physical maps for each EA. The team randomly picked a sampling start point by creating an X and Y axis on the map, then randomly picking a number for each axis. The coordinate arising from the two random values became the starting point. The team identified this point within the EA and started the following random walk pattern to select households:

Enumerators would walk away from the predefined starting point heading north, south, east and west. On each enumerator’s path, interviews were conducted in every fifth household. Thus, in each cardinal direction, the fifth, tenth, fifteenth and twentieth household from the start point was selected. Once each interviewer had completed their fourth and final interview, the team moved to the next EA, where the entire process was repeated. In each of the four households selected for the interview, one adult member was selected randomly from among those present to be interviewed. In waves two and three, these selected respondents were interviewed again using mobile phone calls.

Generally, panel attrition poses a challenge to longitudinal data collection. In the difficult survey environment during times of political instability, non-response becomes an even more acute problem. In anticipation of these challenges, the survey was designed to minimize panel attrition as much as possible. Contacting respondents via mobile phone in the second and third wave ensured that individuals could still be reached, even when they moved to a new location.¹ For all survey waves, enumerators filled in survey forms electronically, using Open Data Kit.² Based on the phone numbers in completed survey forms, we transferred prepaid mobile phone top-ups of 100 Kenyan Shillings (approximately 1 USD) per respondent after each survey round. The reimbursement was intended to thank the respondent for their efforts and generate modest incentives for future participation.

To maximize participation during waves two and three, respondents who could not be reached in an initial contact attempt were called again up to 4 times later on. If a respondent answered the phone, but preferred a different time, a new call at a later time was scheduled. As this multiplied the number of contact attempts in the second and third wave, the project logistics required that only a subset of the original sample was contacted randomly from the list of 2,109 first wave respondents. In the second wave, 1,484 respondents were called of which 907 individuals successfully completed the interview. In the third wave, 1,560 respondents were randomly contacted and 777 completed the interview. Our analysis of the response pattern suggests that observations are missing at random due to non-response. There is no evidence of systematic differences in demographics or response patterns in the between the full initial sample and waves two and three.


3 Analysis of participation across waves: Evaluating if missing at random

To assess if these measures were successful, we analyze if attrition varies across demographic subgroups, i.e. whether demographic variables correlate with subsequent participation. First, to assess if the demo-

¹Almost 15 percent of all respondents who completed wave 2 indicate that they had to leave their homes due to the political situation. This high number highlights the prevalence of displacement, but also indicates that the second wave effectively reached individuals who moved.

²see <https://opendatakit.org/>, retrieved last on November 21, 2018.

Figure A1: Average marginal effects of religious affiliation on participation based on estimates Table A1. 95%-CI reported. X-axis key: 100 = only participated in wave 1, 101 = participated in wave 1 and 3, 110 = participated in waves 1 and 2, 111 = participated in all waves.



graphics of the different survey waves vary, we crosstabulated demographic variables across the different survey waves. For each variable, the following table documents the Chi2 test statistic and p-value as well as Fisher’s exact p-values. The results indicate that the demographic composition of our sample does not vary significantly across survey waves.

Variable	Chi2 test statistic	Chi2 p-value	Fisher’s exact test p-value
1 sex	3.79	0.4	0.3
2 edu	21.37	0.38	0.33
3 ethnicity	30.49	1	1
4 religion	7.96	0.44	0.49
5 other_friends	2.81	0.23	0.27
6 children	1.4	0.51	0.5

Second, we use model how individual participation might be explained with respondents’ demographic characteristics in a multinomial logit model. Table A1 presents the results for this analysis. To impose as little functional form assumptions as possible, we include a dummy variable for each factor level of nominal or ordinal scale variables. There seems to be little systematic variance in participation. Neither age, gender or religion have any predictive power, as all coefficients are small and statistically insignificant.

To probe if there are any meaningful differences in the predicted probability of participation across the nominal or ordinal variables (religion, education and ethnicity), we calculate the average marginal effects for each factor level. Figure A1, A2 and A3 all highlight that neither variable predicts participation.

Hence, the model-based analysis of participation confirms the finding that survey wave participation is uncorrelated with respondents demographic characteristics.

Figure A2: Average marginal effects of education on participation based on estimates Table A1. 95%-CI reported. X-axis key: 100 = only participated in wave 1, 101 = participated in wave 1 and 3, 110 = participated in waves 1 and 2, 111 = participated in all waves.




Figure A3: Average marginal effects of ethnicity on participation based on estimates Table A1. 95%-CI reported. X-axis key: 100 = only participated in wave 1, 101 = participated in wave 1 and 3, 110 = participated in waves 1 and 2, 111 = participated in all waves.




Table A1: Modelling participation. Multinomial logit estimates. Reference category is participation in wave 1 only. Covariate values are based on wave 1 responses.

	Wave 1+3	Wave 1+2	All waves
Age	-0.0000728 (0.00119)	-0.000380 (0.000969)	-0.000740 (0.00272)
Female	0.0884 (0.142)	-0.0733 (0.125)	-0.127 (0.121)
Children	-0.0181 (0.158)	0.206 (0.143)	-0.0307 (0.137)
Islam	-0.0825 (0.181)	0.0907 (0.154)	-0.104 (0.155)
Other/no religion	-0.839 (0.630)	-0.804 (0.558)	-0.418 (0.452)
Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)	-1.708* (0.824)	-0.0278 (0.481)	-0.297 (0.597)
Some primary schooling	-0.348 (0.383)	-0.556 (0.358)	-0.00253 (0.409)
Primary school completed	-0.833* (0.377)	-0.358 (0.335)	0.0125 (0.393)
Some secondary school/ high school	-0.573 (0.383)	-0.503 (0.350)	-0.0310 (0.403)
Secondary school completed/high school completed	-0.310 (0.365)	-0.306 (0.335)	0.344 (0.389)
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from polytechnic or college	-0.169 (0.395)	0.298 (0.353)	0.600 (0.407)
At least some university	0.0470 (0.492)	0.457 (0.436)	0.880 (0.473)
Luo	0.189 (0.245)	0.429* (0.218)	0.246 (0.205)
Luhya	0.457 (0.239)	0.291 (0.227)	0.314 (0.208)
Kamba	0.286 (0.250)	0.350 (0.229)	0.167 (0.217)
MijiKenda	0.0321 (0.259)	0.208 (0.228)	-0.0969 (0.224)
Taita	0.158 (0.353)	0.457 (0.298)	0.364 (0.284)
Somali	-0.383 (0.546)	-0.316 (0.459)	-0.644 (0.498)
Mixed	-0.0297 (0.363)	-0.0359 (0.322)	-0.160 (0.315)
Other ethnicities	0.0481 (0.262)	0.369 (0.226)	0.206 (0.215)

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Table A1: *continued*

Constant	-0.813 (0.417)	-0.861* (0.382)	-0.827 (0.431)
Observations	2115		

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$
 Participated only in wave 1 is reference category.

4 Ethnic politics and religious affiliation

Our survey took place during a contentious presidential elections. In order to alleviate potential concern that tensions along religious lines are actually highly correlated with political preferences, Table 4 shows that the main political rivals, President Kenyatta and his challenger Odinga are preferred by roughly an equal share of Muslim/Christian respondents.

Table A2: Leader preference across religious groups. Question wording "In your opinion, who would be the best leader for Kenya?", asked only in wave 2 and 3. Row percentages reported, number of observations in parentheses.

	Christian	Islam	Total
None	66.39 (79)	33.61 (40)	100.00 (119)
Kenyatta	72.68 (391)	27.32 (147)	100.00 (538)
Odinga	75.38 (502)	24.62 (164)	100.00 (666)
both	69.93 (100)	30.07 (43)	100.00 (143)
do not know	61.54 (56)	38.46 (35)	100.00 (91)
refuse	69.81 (74)	30.19 (32)	100.00 (106)
Total	72.28 (1202)	27.72 (461)	100.00 (1663)

Given that ethnicity is widely regarded as a highly salient identity category in Kenyan politics and ethnicity might therefore be reinforced by the political struggle as a relevant identity category, we examine how religious affiliation and ethnic identity are related. Table 4 highlights that religion cross-cuts ethnic identities. In fact, with the sole exception of Somali respondents, we observe a considerable share of both Christians and Muslims in all ethnic groups. This reassures us that our results regarding religious identity should not be the spurious result of ethnic politics. In fact, longstanding insights from social psychology suggest that if e.g. political competition reinforces ethnicity as a salient identity and if religion cross-cuts this relevant identity dimension, i.e. it is uninformative for self-categorization along the salient ethnic identity dimension, then we would expect religion to become less relevant as an identity dimension. What is more, stronger ethnic identification should reinforce the perception that individuals of the own ethnic in-group are similar, regardless of religious identity. In contrast, members of ethnic out-group will be viewed as different from the own in-group (Ellemers and Haslam 2012). In other words, we would expect the political competition to instill groupness along an ethnic dimension, which blurs perceived religious differences. Cross-national survey research in African countries supports this logic and shows that electoral competition reduces the likelihood that an individual identifies mainly along religious lines (Eifert et al. 2010). Empirically, we therefore expect that the attention directed towards ethnicity due to the election would attenuate any religious identification. This would bias our results towards zero and imply that the context of our survey presents a hard test for our theory.

Table A3: Religious affiliation across ethnic groups. Smaller groups in the sample are grouped in the category "other ethnicities". Row percentages reported, number of observations in parentheses.

	Christian	Islam	Total
Kikuyu	84.56 (482)	15.44 (88)	100.00 (570)
Luo	89.60 (517)	10.40 (60)	100.00 (577)
Luhya	87.50 (483)	12.50 (69)	100.00 (552)
Kamba	86.11 (409)	13.89 (66)	100.00 (475)
MijiKenda	32.20 (199)	67.80 (419)	100.00 (618)
Taita	74.27 (153)	25.73 (53)	100.00 (206)
Somali	0.00 (0)	100.00 (70)	100.00 (70)
Mixed	17.55 (33)	82.45 (155)	100.00 (188)
Other ethnicities	76.03 (368)	23.97 (116)	100.00 (484)
Total	70.70 (2644)	29.30 (1096)	100.00 (3740)

5 Direct questions

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Table A4: Descriptive statistics for direct questions. (* indicates factor variable)

	n	mean	sd	min	max
Own religious group should stick together*	3780	4.34	0.76	1	5
Support for segregation*	3783	2.02	1.28	1	5
Support for marriage with Muslim*	2593	3.30	1.42	1	5
Support for marriage with Christian*	1068	3.17	1.51	1	5
Personal exposure to KSF indiscriminate violence	3705	0.04	0.20	0	1
Personal exposure to KSF selective violence	3680	0.03	0.18	0	1
Personal exposure to islamist indiscriminate violence	3708	0.02	0.16	0	1
Personal exposure to islamist selective violence	3705	0.02	0.14	0	1
Fear of KSF (no/yes)	3806	0.53	0.50	0	1
Fear of islamists (no/yes)	3806	0.63	0.48	0	1
Job situation*	3798	3.84	1.78	1	6
Food shortage last month (no/yes)	3806	0.52	0.50	0	1
Follow leaders of own religious group*	3753	2.78	1.32	1	5
Highest level of education*	3804	5.17	1.68	1	11
Female (no/yes)	3806	0.58	0.49	0	1
Has children (no/yes)	3804	0.72	0.45	0	1

Figure A4: Personal exposure to KSF violence across survey waves among Muslims.




Figure A5: Personal exposure to islamist violence across survey waves among Christians.




Figure A6: Fear of armed groups across survey waves.





Figure A7: Distribution of violent events across Kenya.



5.2 Robustness check: (Ordered) Logit instead of linear model

Table A5: Repeat analysis for Christian respondents using (ordered) logit models.

	Fear of Islamists		Stick together		Segregation		Marrying Muslim	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	0.666* (0.335)	0.200 (0.293)	0.200 (0.293)	0.564* (0.259)	0.516* (0.259)	-0.474 (0.261)	-0.453 (0.262)	
Exposed to selective islamist violence	0.119 (0.356)	-0.431 (0.326)	-0.431 (0.326)	-0.128 (0.305)	-0.124 (0.306)	-0.184 (0.287)	-0.193 (0.287)	
Fear of Islamists		0.002 (0.095)	0.002 (0.095)	0.433** (0.089)	0.433** (0.089)	-0.234** (0.085)	-0.234** (0.085)	
Control variables								
Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	-0.0005 (0.250)	0.117 (0.237)	0.117 (0.237)	0.114 (0.211)	0.115 (0.213)	0.095 (0.207)	0.078 (0.207)	
Exposed to selective KSF violence	-0.083 (0.283)	0.023 (0.267)	0.023 (0.267)	0.005 (0.244)	-0.020 (0.245)	-0.139 (0.233)	-0.125 (0.234)	
Fear of KSF		0.002 (0.089)	0.002 (0.089)	0.138 (0.083)	0.138 (0.083)	0.234** (0.080)	0.234** (0.080)	
No job and looking	-0.178 (0.172)	0.139 (0.169)	0.139 (0.169)	-0.676** (0.151)	-0.647** (0.150)	-0.031 (0.153)	-0.038 (0.153)	
No job, still studying	0.175 (0.235)	-0.161 (0.225)	-0.161 (0.225)	-0.607** (0.206)	-0.625** (0.206)	0.055 (0.202)	0.044 (0.202)	
Part-time job, not looking	0.428* (0.182)	0.238 (0.172)	0.238 (0.173)	-0.857** (0.154)	-0.897** (0.154)	-0.253 (0.156)	-0.241 (0.157)	
Part-time job, looking for second job	0.212 (0.218)	0.573** (0.214)	0.573** (0.214)	-1.242** (0.196)	-1.252** (0.196)	-0.306 (0.194)	-0.281 (0.194)	
Full-time job	0.073 (0.170)	0.383* (0.166)	0.383* (0.166)	-0.821** (0.147)	-0.812** (0.146)	-0.313* (0.150)	-0.293 (0.150)	
Experienced food shortage during past month	0.062 (0.090)	0.087 (0.084)	0.087 (0.085)	0.249** (0.078)	0.247** (0.078)	-0.017 (0.076)	-0.023 (0.076)	
Follow leaders - 'agree'	-0.145 (0.128)	-1.514** (0.129)	-1.513** (0.129)	0.252* (0.114)	0.275* (0.114)	-0.158 (0.114)	-0.155 (0.114)	
Follow leaders - 'neither agree nor disagree'	-0.083 (0.160)	-1.103** (0.155)	-1.102** (0.155)	-0.468** (0.146)	-0.447** (0.147)	-0.233 (0.139)	-0.227 (0.139)	
Follow leaders - 'disagree'	-0.179 (0.133)	-1.707** (0.133)	-1.707** (0.134)	0.105 (0.117)	0.131 (0.118)	-0.246* (0.117)	-0.246* (0.117)	
Follow leaders - 'strongly disagree'	0.005 (0.164)	-0.723** (0.167)	-0.723** (0.167)	-0.834** (0.162)	-0.837** (0.163)	-0.019 (0.154)	-0.005 (0.154)	
Constant	0.391* (0.188)							
Model	Logit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N	2491	2482	2482	2483	2483	2441	2441	

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Table A6: Repeat analysis for Muslim respondents using (ordered) logit models.

	Fear of KSF		Stick together		Segregation		Marrying Christian	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	
Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	-0.126 (0.325)	0.489 (0.328)	0.490 (0.327)	0.424 (0.297)	0.438 (0.300)	-0.400 (0.292)	-0.395 (0.293)	
Exposed to selective KSF violence	0.864* (0.377)	-0.668 (0.350)	-0.678 (0.350)	0.174 (0.314)	0.081 (0.314)	0.665* (0.300)	0.632* (0.302)	
Fear of KSF		0.007 (0.146)		0.322* (0.139)		-0.178 (0.129)		
Control variables								
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	-0.200 (0.479)	0.062 (0.513)	0.063 (0.513)	-0.039 (0.465)	-0.031 (0.469)	-0.421 (0.388)	-0.447 (0.392)	
Exposed to selective islamist violence	0.592 (0.547)	-0.361 (0.535)	-0.370 (0.535)	0.283 (0.495)	0.223 (0.500)	0.352 (0.420)	0.337 (0.422)	
Fear of Islamists		0.078 (0.146)	0.078 (0.146)	0.273* (0.138)	0.273* (0.138)	0.473** (0.129)	0.473** (0.129)	
No job and looking	-0.097 (0.234)	0.162 (0.240)	0.161 (0.240)	-0.416 (0.221)	-0.422 (0.210)	-0.216 (0.210)	-0.239 (0.211)	
No job, still studying	0.221 (0.383)	-0.052 (0.379)	-0.063 (0.379)	-0.004 (0.340)	-0.050 (0.342)	0.384 (0.334)	0.323 (0.335)	
Part-time job, not looking	0.119 (0.248)	0.168 (0.252)	0.159 (0.253)	-0.394 (0.234)	-0.434 (0.235)	0.111 (0.224)	0.068 (0.225)	
Part-time job, looking for second job	0.630 (0.341)	1.281** (0.363)	1.268** (0.364)	-0.479 (0.313)	-0.578 (0.316)	0.261 (0.284)	0.227 (0.286)	
Full-time job	0.094 (0.241)	0.522* (0.248)	0.516* (0.248)	-0.562* (0.226)	-0.599** (0.226)	-0.286 (0.215)	-0.309 (0.215)	
Experienced food shorlag during past month	-0.191 (0.136)	-0.093 (0.136)	-0.096 (0.136)	0.123 (0.127)	0.127 (0.127)	0.159 (0.118)	0.139 (0.118)	
Follow leaders - 'agree'	-0.352 (0.184)	-1.597** (0.202)	-1.586** (0.202)	-0.052 (0.170)	-0.011 (0.171)	-0.339* (0.166)	-0.306 (0.166)	
Follow leaders - 'neither agree nor disagree'	-0.132 (0.252)	-1.571** (0.259)	-1.568** (0.260)	-0.792** (0.241)	-0.794** (0.241)	0.082 (0.219)	0.080 (0.219)	
Follow leaders - 'disagree'	-0.503* (0.204)	-1.664** (0.218)	-1.655** (0.218)	-0.527** (0.187)	-0.470* (0.189)	0.054 (0.178)	0.078 (0.180)	
Follow leaders - 'strongly disagree'	-0.152 (0.246)	-0.989** (0.271)	-0.985** (0.271)	-1.212** (0.262)	-1.204** (0.263)	-0.004 (0.238)	0.030 (0.239)	
Constant	0.394 (0.259)							
Model	Logit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N	1038	1034	1034	1028	1028	1015	1015	

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

5.3 Robustness check: Disaggregate violence variable further

Table A7: Repeat analysis for Christian respondents with disaggregated violence item.

	Fear of Islamists		Stick together		Segregation		Marrying Muslim	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	
Heard of/read about indiscriminate islamist violence	0.150** (0.038)	0.053 (0.063)	0.051 (0.063)	0.289** (0.105)	0.246* (0.105)	0.040 (0.109)	0.061 (0.110)	
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	0.362** (0.098)	0.053 (0.163)	0.045 (0.164)	0.597* (0.272)	0.505 (0.272)	0.065 (0.279)	0.140 (0.280)	
Heard of/read about selective islamist violence	-0.014 (0.038)	-0.078 (0.063)	-0.080 (0.063)	-0.130 (0.106)	-0.120 (0.105)	-0.046 (0.110)	-0.039 (0.109)	
Exposed to selective islamist violence	-0.049 (0.112)	-0.379* (0.186)	-0.372* (0.186)	0.004 (0.311)	-0.004 (0.309)	-0.278 (0.322)	-0.316 (0.321)	
Fear of Islamists		0.028 (0.054)	0.028 (0.054)	0.239** (0.089)	0.239** (0.089)		-0.229* (0.093)	
Time-varying control variables included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Respondent FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N	2491	2482	2482	2483	2483	2441	2441	

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Table A8: Repeat analysis for Muslim respondents with disaggregated violence item.

	Fear of KSF			Stick together			Segregation			Marrying Christian		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7					
Heard of/read about indiscriminate KSF violence	0.087 (0.064)	0.083 (0.101)	0.075 (0.101)	0.129 (0.164)	0.086 (0.162)	-0.381* (0.185)	-0.394* (0.185)					
Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	0.011 (0.128)	0.159 (0.200)	0.154 (0.200)	0.038 (0.330)	0.006 (0.326)	-1.008** (0.368)	-1.041** (0.367)					
Heard of/read about selective KSF violence	0.0003 (0.061)	-0.112 (0.096)	-0.111 (0.096)	0.076 (0.156)	0.078 (0.154)	0.248 (0.178)	0.246 (0.178)					
Exposed to selective KSF violence	-0.102 (0.133)	-0.396 (0.208)	-0.381 (0.209)	-0.246 (0.342)	-0.157 (0.338)	0.184 (0.386)	0.230 (0.386)					
Fear of KSF			0.055 (0.085)		0.230 (0.137)		-0.033 (0.156)					
Heard of/read about indiscriminate islamist violence	-0.042 (0.064)	-0.037 (0.100)	-0.036 (0.100)	-0.033 (0.162)	-0.029 (0.160)	-0.179 (0.181)	-0.185 (0.181)					
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	0.433* (0.205)	0.389 (0.322)	0.355 (0.324)	0.072 (0.523)	-0.094 (0.519)	-0.301 (0.580)	-0.349 (0.582)					
Heard of/read about selective islamist violence	0.052 (0.071)	0.088 (0.112)	0.083 (0.112)	0.289 (0.182)	0.257 (0.180)	0.120 (0.204)	0.104 (0.203)					
Exposed to selective islamist violence	0.280 (0.199)	-0.254 (0.312)	-0.271 (0.313)	0.245 (0.530)	0.163 (0.524)	0.638 (0.566)	0.646 (0.566)					
Fear of Islamists			0.044 (0.081)		0.288* (0.130)		0.275 (0.147)					
Time-varying control variables included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
Respondent FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
N	1038	1034	1034	1028	1028	1015	1015					

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

5.4 Analyze Christian and Muslim respondents in one model, model differential effect using interaction effect

Table A9: Repeat analysis for all respondents and model differential effect between Christians and Muslims using interaction effects.

	Fear of Islamists		Fear of KSF		Stick together		Segregation		Marrying Muslim	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 3	Model 4	Model 4	Model 5	Model 5
Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	-0.024 (0.074)	0.208** (0.078)	0.148 (0.118)	0.003 (0.197)	0.002 (0.206)					
Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence * Muslim	0.059 (0.137)	-0.286* (0.144)	-0.059 (0.217)	-0.037 (0.370)	-0.678 (0.385)					
Exposed to selective KSF violence	0.086 (0.091)	-0.054 (0.095)	-0.112 (0.144)	-0.249 (0.240)	-0.432 (0.253)					
Exposed to selective KSF violence * Muslim	-0.285 (0.154)	-0.026 (0.162)	-0.165 (0.244)	0.145 (0.410)	0.569 (0.431)					
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	0.246* (0.096)	0.005 (0.101)	0.007 (0.153)	0.289 (0.255)	0.089 (0.266)					
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence * Muslim	-0.021 (0.220)	0.394 (0.232)	0.378 (0.351)	-0.532 (0.588)	-0.505 (0.608)					
Exposed to selective islamist violence	-0.028 (0.113)	0.153 (0.118)	-0.311 (0.179)	0.110 (0.298)	-0.260 (0.314)					
Exposed to selective islamist violence * Muslim	-0.038 (0.219)	0.067 (0.230)	0.047 (0.347)	-0.129 (0.600)	0.873 (0.606)					
Fear of KSF			-0.054 (0.048)	0.174* (0.080)	0.227** (0.084)					
Fear of KSF * Muslim			0.119 (0.098)	0.077 (0.164)	-0.255 (0.172)					
Fear of Islamists			0.010 (0.052)	0.337** (0.087)	-0.216* (0.092)					
Fear of Islamists * Muslim			0.031 (0.095)	-0.040 (0.160)	0.451** (0.167)					
Time-varying control variables included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
Respondent FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes					
N	3529	3529	3516	3511	3456					


* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

6 Endorsement experiment

6.1 Barplots of answers in control group

In order for the endorsement experiment to allow a treatment effect in any direction, the answers to the question need to be distributed evenly among the answer categories. Figure A8 shows that this is the case.

Figure A8: Answers to the endorsement questions in the control group. Answers were given on a five point likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” (dark grey) to “strongly disagree” (light grey).



6.2 Correlation between questions in control group

In the control group, in which no endorsement changes the attitude towards the policies, the answers to the endorsement questions on policies regarding water pipes, water treatment plants and water purchases are highly correlated, indicating that they pick up the same latent attitude. The following table displays Spearman’s rank correlations for the answers to the three questions in the control group.

	pipes	plants	purchase
pipes	1.00	0.70	0.75
plants	0.70	1.00	0.75
purchase	0.75	0.75	1.00

6.3 Coefficient estimates for endorsement experiment

Table A10: Endorsement experiment for Christian respondents.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Muslim endorsement	-0.006 (0.035)		-0.011 (0.035)	
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	0.315* (0.150)	0.464* (0.228)		
Exposed to selective islamist violence			-0.045 (0.176)	-0.032 (0.282)
Muslim endorsement * Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	-0.470* (0.208)	-0.657* (0.305)		
Muslim endorsement * Exposed to selective islamist violence			-0.184 (0.235)	-0.096 (0.369)
Constant	3.034** (0.158)		3.079** (0.157)	
Control variables included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent-endorsement question RE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Respondent-endorsement question FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	7592	7592	7575	7575

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Endorsement experiment for Muslim respondents.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Christian endorsement	-0.050 (0.054)		-0.071 (0.054)	
Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	0.158 (0.152)	-0.093 (0.233)		
Exposed to selective KSF violence			-0.086 (0.166)	-0.660* (0.266)
Christian endorsement * Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	-0.072 (0.219)	-0.133 (0.354)		
Christian endorsement * Exposed to selective KSF violence			0.363 (0.240)	0.432 (0.389)
Constant	3.555** (0.162)		3.656** (0.162)	
Control variables included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent-endorsement question RE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Respondent-endorsement question FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3160	3160	3130	3130

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

6.4 Endorsement experiment - examine effect of violence by “own in-group”

Table A12: Endorsement experiment for Christian respondents - examining KSF violence.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Muslim endorsement	-0.005 (0.035)		0.00001 (0.035)	
Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	0.113 (0.118)	-0.195 (0.170)		
Exposed to selective KSF violence			-0.171 (0.138)	-0.632** (0.207)
Muslim endorsement * Exposed to indiscriminate KSF violence	-0.165 (0.170)	-0.073 (0.235)		
Muslim endorsement * Exposed to selective KSF violence			-0.233 (0.192)	-0.067 (0.287)
Constant	2.966** (0.155)		3.092** (0.156)	
Control variables included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent-endorsement question RE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Respondent-endorsement question FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	7592	7592	7567	7567

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Table A13: Endorsement experiment for Muslim respondents - examining Islamist violence.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Christian endorsement	-0.050 (0.053)		-0.047 (0.053)	
Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	0.203 (0.264)	-0.042 (0.473)		
Exposed to selective islamist violence			0.057 (0.243)	-0.167 (0.359)
Christian endorsement * Exposed to indiscriminate islamist violence	-0.015 (0.335)	0.268 (0.598)		
Christian endorsement * Exposed to selective islamist violence			-0.018 (0.359)	0.234 (0.559)
Constant	3.559** (0.162)		3.529** (0.160)	
Control variables included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent-endorsement question RE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Respondent-endorsement question FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	3157	3157	3166	3166

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Figure A9: Endorsement effects among Christian and Muslim respondents - examine effect of violence by "own in-group" (with 95% confidence intervals)



References

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